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Unstable Individual Bids and Stable Market Demand 
 
Abstract: We explore preference stability at the individual and market level.  We examine 
individual bidding behavior among 116 French consumers who participated in experimental 
auctions conducted seven months apart for five types of fish.  We reject preference stability at 
the individual level, but not at the aggregate market level.  
 
JEL: C91, D12, Q13 
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1.  Introduction 
Stable market demand arising from stable individual preferences remains a classic 
assumption in neoclassical demand theory (e.g., Varian 1982; Ariely et al. 2003).  But stable 
individual preferences is a sufficient not a necessary condition for a stable market demand 
curve.
1 For example, Härdle and Kirman (1995) report stabile market demand created through 
aggregation in their field study of professional buyers in the Marseilles fish market.  They found 
downward sloping demand curves at the aggregate level but not at the individual level and 
concluded that: “sophisticated and complicated individual behaviour may lead to simple 
aggregate properties” (p. 228).   
We use a controlled experimental auction setting to explore preference stability at the 
individual and market level. We test for preference stability using a panel of 116 French 
consumers who participated in two experimental auctions conducted seven months apart for five 
types of fish.  We measure stability based on bids elicited by using the Becker DeGroot 
Marschak (1964) mechanism (BDM), and reject the hypothesis that individual bids are stable.  
However, we find that the market demand curves are stable indicating that stable market 
preferences are due to the market’s aggregation properties across consumers. This supports the 
broader notion that stability in economic behavior should be defined as a social construct, not an 
individual one (Arrow 1987; Smith 1993). 
                                                 
1 Becker (1962) showed how well behaved downward sloping aggregate demand curves can be derived for a wide 
class of behavior, including random choices within the budget set. 3 
 
 
2.  Repeated Experimental Auctions: Sample and Design  
We conducted the experiments in the sensory laboratory of l’institut national de la 
recherche agronomique (INRA) in Dijon.  Based on INRA’s consumer panel, we created a panel 
of 116 typical French consumers who participated in two experimental auctions conducted in 
May and December 2008.  The sample consisted of 63 women and 53 men, age ranging from 23 
to 70 years old, with an average of 48 years.  All the participants said they eat fish at least once a 
month and purchase fish at least every second month. 
  Participants were paid €25 per session.  Each participant evaluated salmon, wild cod, 
farmed cod, monk, and pangasius.  Each session had two parts and a survey.  The first part was a 
sensory evaluation.  After a professional chef cooked the fish, each participant was served 50 
grams of each fish in rotational order to avoid any ordering effects.  Before tasting, the 
participants were told what fish they were served. After tasting, the participants gave their 
hedonic scores.
2 
  The second part elicited preferences for the fish.  Stable individual preferences would 
imply stable bidding behavior in the experimental auctions conducted at different times.  We 
used a BDM mechanism, in which each bidder’s weakly dominant strategy is to bid the amount 
that leaves him indifferent between obtaining the product or not.  While demand revealing in 
theory, such mechanisms frequently require some initial training (e.g., Lusk and Shogren 2007: 
63).  We first explained the BDM and then the participants practiced bidding on orange juice or 
champagne. 
 
3.  Results  
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the bids.  The median bids remained stable from May 
to December for all fish types except farmed cod.  For farmed cod, the median bid increased 
from €8.00 to €9.25.  The mean bid for farmed cod increased from €7.82 to €8.71 while the 
mean bids fell slightly for the other fish types.   
 
3.1. Stability results 
Four main results with respect to stability emerge from our experiments. 
                                                 
2 We do not discuss the results of the sensory evaluations, however, the individual hedonic scores are also unstable. 4 
 
 
Result 1.  Individual preferences are unstable across the two sessions.  
Support.  In Row 1 of Table 2, we present the number of participants with constant bids (mostly 
0 in both experiments).  Rows 2 through 4 shows the number of participants who changed bids 
by less than half a standard deviation; by one half to one standard deviation; and by more than 
one standard deviation. As seen in Table 1, the standard deviations being in range of €3.74 to 
€6.91 for the different fishes. More than 50 participants changed their bids by more than half a 
standard deviation for each fish type.  
Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the bids in May and 
December and the associated 95% confidence intervals.  Zero correlation suggests independent 
valuations in the two experiments, i.e., random bidding, while a correlation factor of one implies 
constant bidding.  All the correlation coefficients are significantly different from zero and one, 
suggesting that the individual bids are positively correlated between the two experiments; 
however, they do not come from a group of individuals with stable preferences.  
 
Result 2.  Aggregate market demand curves are stable across the two sessions.  














where  ijt x is the quantity demanded of product j by individual i at time t, pjt is the price of the 
good, and  ijt Bid is the bid.
3 Let participant 1 be the highest bidder, participant 2 the second 
highest bidder, and so on; n participants are willing to pay at least the same as participant n’s bid.  










We constructed the market demand curves for May using equation (2), i.e., by ranking the 
individual participant’s bid from the highest to the lowest.  The market demand curves for 
                                                 
3 Each package of fish weighted about 300 grams, which may be insufficient for a meal in a household consisting of 
more than two persons. To avoid that the package size caused zero bids, we let each participant choose if he wanted 
to purchase 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 packages of fish before the bidding. Since this procedure was implemented for practical 
reasons, we count the individual demand in equation (1) as 1 rather than the requested number of packages. 5 
 
salmon and wild cod are shown by the solid lines in Panels A and B of Figure 1.  In these panels, 
the December bids using the same ordering of the participants as in May are plotted as the dots.   
  As discussed above, the individual bids change in erratic ways.  For example, Panel A 
shows 11 participants who bid a positive amount for salmon in May bid zero in December; 10 
participants who bid zero in December bid a positive amount in May.  The second highest bidder 
for wild cod in May, who bid €20, was only the 56
th highest bidder in December with €10, and 
the third highest bidder in December, who bid €19.90, was only the 29
th highest bidder in 
December with €14.  Of the 11 participants who bid a positive amount for wild cod in May, but 
not in December, 9 bid a positive amount for salmon in December.  This result shows even 
though these participants did not want to buy wild cod, they still wanted to buy fish.  
  To investigate the stability of market demand, we constructed the market demand curves 
in December as in May, i.e., by ranking the participants bids from the highest to the lowest bid.  
Panels C and D present the results for salmon and wild cod.  As shown in the figures, none of the 
market demand curves shift substantially.
4 
  Several statistical tests were implemented to test for the stability of the market demand 
curves.  We use a Wilcoxon signed rank test (W) to test for identical median bids, a Brown 
Forsythe test (B F) to test for identical variances of bids, and a Kolmogorov Smirnov test (K S) 
to test for identical probability distribution functions for bids in the two experiments (Hollander 
and Wolfe 1999).  Table 3 presents the test values and the associated p values of the tests.  The 
median bid for farmed cod increased significantly.  This increase may be explained by a 
improved quality as reflected by a significant increase in the median hedonic score.  The median 
bids for the other fish types did not change.  Finally, we do not reject identical variance or 
identical distribution functions for any of the bids in May and December. 
 
Result 3. Individual differences in WTP are unstable across the two sessions.  
Support.  We find the same pattern of unstability in individual valuation when we look at the 
individual bid differences between the five types of fish. Table 4 shows the Pearson correlation 
coefficients for a selection of the bid difference in May and December and the associated 95% 
confidence intervals.  Zero correlation suggests independent bid differences in the two 
experiments, i.e., the unstability in bids we saw in Figure 1 is not a result of the individuals 
                                                 
4 Figures for farmed cod, monk, and pangasius show similar patterns but are not presented here. 6 
 
increasing or decreasing all their bids. On the other side, a correlation factor of one implies 
constant bid differences, i.e., the unstability seen in Figure 1 is  results of individuals increasing 
or decreasing all their bids, keeping the differences constants. All the correlation coefficients are 
significantly different from zero and one, suggesting that the individual bid differences are 
positively correlated between the two experiments; however, they do not come from a group of 
individuals with stable valuation differences.  
Not only did the many participants change the difference between their bids, many also 
changed their ranking of the five fish types. As shown by the last row of table 2, only 11 
participants had a constant ranking of the bids.  Furthermore, only 53 of 116 participants ranked 
salmon identically according to the bids in May and December.  The corresponding numbers for 
wild cod, farmed cod, monk, and pangasius are 47, 43, 61, and 69.  
  Figure 2a shows the bids for salmon subtracted the bids for wild cod in May and 
December, ranked by the May differences. There are two types of information that can be read 
out of figure Figure 2a. First, it illustrates that it is not only unstability in the level of the bids, 
but also in the difference between the bids. And they show that these changes can be quite big. 
Second, the figure also illustrate changes in the ranking of products. Any participant in Figure 2a 
where the dot for the December bid is on the opposite side of zero as the corresponding solid line 
representing the May bids has changed ranking for these two products. We can see that some of 
the changes in rankings are due to minor changes in bid differences, while other are due large 
changes in bid differences.  
 
Result 4.  Aggregate difference in WTP curves are stable across the two sessions.  
Support.  As illustrated in Figure 2b, we find that the unstability in bid differences disappear 
when we look at aggregates. Table 4 present the same tests as described above for Table 3. We 
find that the median bid differences for did not change between May and December, except for 
those involving farmed cod. Finally, we do not reject identical variance or identical distribution 
functions for any of the bids differences in May and December. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
Our results suggest that individual preferences were unstable over experimental sessions for 
French consumers.  Even though the individual preferences are unstable, aggregation across 7 
 
participants creates stable market demand curves.  Our results further supports the general notion 
that random day to day variations in individual preferences have minor effects on the stability of 
the market demand.  This is good news since food producers and retailers are primarily interested 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Bids 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
  Mean  Median  St Dev  Min  Max  N  Zeros 
Salmon 
  May  10.16  10.00  5.70  0.00  25.00  116  15 
  December  10.01  10.00  5.10  0.00  18.00  116  13 
Wild cod 
  May  9.87  10.00  5.59  0.00  23.00  116  16 
  December  9.81  10.00  5.66  0.00  20.00  116  18 
Farmed cod 
  May  7.82  8.00  5.50  0.00  21.00  116  25 
  December  8.71  9.25  5.79  0.00  22.00  116  23 
Monk 
  May  11.40  12.00  6.60  0.00  25.00  116  20 
  December  10.75  12.00  6.91  0.00  24.00  116  24 
Pangasius 
  May  2.28  0.00  4.06  0.00  18.00  116  82 















Table 2. Stability of Individual Bids 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
  Salmon  Wild Cod Farmed Cod  Monk  Pangasius  Total 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Constant bid  21  17  17  22  79 
0 < Change < 0.5·SD  44  31  37  40  10 
0.5·SD ≤ Change ≤ 1.0·SD  31  29  26  24  9 
Change > 1.0·SD  20  39  36  30  18 




Table 3. Test Results for Stability 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
   P
a  95% CI
b  W
c  p value   B F
d  p value  K S
e  p value 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Salmon    0.63  0.50 0.73  0.16  0.87  1.20  0.28  0.08  0.88 
Wild cod  0.46  0.31 0.59   0.07  0.95  0.01  0.94  0.03  1.00 
Farmed cod  0.51  0.36 0.63   2.12  0.03  0.55  0.46  0.12  0.37 
Monk    0.53  0.39 0.65  0.62  0.53  1.03  0.31  0.09  0.57 
Pangasius  0.65  0.54 0.75  0.33  0.74  1.18  0.37  0.40  0.53 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes:  
a Pearson correlation coefficient as estimated by STATA corrci command.  
b95 % confidence interval for Pearson correlation coefficient estimated by STATA corrci 
command using the Fisher transformation. 
cWilcoxon signed rank test as estimated by STATA signrank command.  
d Brown Forsythe test of equal variance as estimated by STATA robvar command.  
e Kolmogorov–Smirnov test as estimated by STATA ksmirnov command.    10 
 
Table 4. Test Results for Stability in Bid Differences 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
   P
a  95% CI
b  W
c  p value   B F
d  p value  K S
e  p value 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
SA WC
f   0.55  0.40 0.66  0.49  0.63  0.00  0.99  0.07  0.94 
SA FC    0.52  0.37 0.64  2.05  0.04  0.13  0.71  0.02  0.49 
SA MK   0.63  0.51 0.68   0.67  0.51  0.77  0.38  0.08  0.88 
SA PG    0.57  0.43 0.68   0.23  0.82  1.29  0.26  0.05  0.99 
WC FC   0.30  0.13 0.46  1.73  0.08  1.07  0.30  0.12  0.35 
WC MO  0.38  0.17 0.49  1.27  0.21  0.13  0.71  0.09  0.57 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Notes:  
a Pearson correlation coefficient as estimated by STATA corrci command.  
b95 % confidence interval for Pearson correlation coefficient estimated by STATA corrci 
command using the Fisher transformation. 
cWilcoxon signed rank test as estimated by STATA signrank command.  
d Brown Forsythe test of equal variance as estimated by STATA robvar command.  
e Kolmogorov–Smirnov test as estimated by STATA ksmirnov command.  
f SA= salmon, WC=wild cod, FC=farmed cod, MO=monk, PA=pangasius. SA WC is the bid for 
salmon subtracted the bid for wild cod. Similar for the others.   11 
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